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SYMPOSIUM
ETHICS AND EVIDENCE
INTRODUCTION
Daniel J. Capra*
In 2000, the Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules proposed a number
of amendments that were designed to prevent perceived abuse by lawyers of
some of the Federal Rules of Evidence. For example, an amendment to
Rule 701 was designed to prevent lawyers from evading the disclosure and
admissibility requirements of expert testimony by presenting the expert as a
lay witness; and an amendment to Rule 703 attempts to stop lawyers from
evading the hearsay rule by calling an expert who goes out of his way to
rely on hearsay as the basis for an opinion, with the goal of disclosing the
hearsay to the jury. When the proposals were reviewed by the Judicial
Conference Rules Committee, one of the judges on that committee
remarked ruefully that the Advisory Committee was "trying to take all the
fun out of practicing law." In his view, there was nothing wrong in clever
lawyers finding ways to evade the exclusionary rules of evidence; indeed
that was part of the fun of practicing law, and, implicitly, such a practice
was an example of ethical lawyering.
The evidence rules are rife with possibilities of loophole lawyering; it
would be impossible to close all the loopholes and thereby take all the fun
out of litigation. For example, the evidence rules generally prohibit
evidence of a person's character trait when offered to show that the person
acted in accordance with that trait; but if the proponent can make a credible
argument that the evidence is offered for a not-for-character purpose, then
the evidence is likely to be admissible for that purpose and the opponent is
left with a limiting instruction of dubious effectiveness.' And while the
hearsay rule prohibits the admission of an out-of-court statement when
offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, that statement will be
admissible (again with a dubious limiting instruction) if the proponent can
make a credible argument that the statement is probative for some not-for-
truth purpose such as "context."'2 These arguments can be made even if the
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1. Fed. R. of Evid. 404(b).
2. Fed. R. of Evid. 801 (a)-(c).
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unstated intent of the proponent is to have the fact-finder consider the
statement for the truth of the matter asserted.
The loopholes in the evidence rules raise the question whether ethics
rules can or should step in to prevent any perceived abuse. Assuming that
the ethics rules should have an independent role in regulating the
presentation of evidence, under what circumstances is this regulation
warranted? Is there any legitimate ethical concern in bending, but not
breaking, the evidence rules? And are there any other ways in which the
evidence rules and the ethics rules can be effectively intertwined? These
are some of the issues that led to the proposal to arrange this Symposium on
ethics and evidence.
The authors in this Symposium address three important questions about
the interrelationship between ethics rules and evidence rules:
(1) Do ethics rules impose any limitations on the use (and arguable
abuse) of evidence rules?
(2) Do evidence rules enforce ethical principles of lawyering, and if
not, why not?
(3) What specific areas of evidentiary practice are most in need of an
infusion of ethical principles?
The authors of this Symposium take a variety of approaches to these
basic questions. Two authors focus on specific evidence rules and the
ethical questions they present. Dan Blinka addresses the 2000 amendment
to Rule 703 and explores how the Advisory Committee's attempt to curb
abuse might actually lead to more abuse of the Rule. Gerry Shargel
considers whether the protections of a particular evidence rule-Rule
608(b)-impacts witness preparation and possible client perjury.
Two of the contributors focus on the potential of the evidence rules to
regulate unethical conduct. Ed Imwinkelried illustrates how the evidentiary
principle of curative admissibility deters the unethical use of inadmissible
evidence. Fred Zacharias analyzes the interface between evidence rules and
ethical proscriptions, and the sometimes uneasy relationship between these
two bodies of law.
It is not surprising that several authors in this Symposium chose to focus
on the prosecutor's preparation and admission of evidence. The
prosecutorial abuses in the Duke lacrosse case raise serious questions about
whether the existing rules of ethics and evidence are sufficient to guarantee
that a prosecutor will do justice and not abuse the process. Bob Mosteller
provides a compelling account of the prosecutor's misdeeds in the Duke
lacrosse case. Myrna Raeder shows that greater protections are necessary to
prevent the prosecutor from generating questionable evidence from
jailhouse informants and experts whose testimony is "too good to be true."
Finally Rob Aronson and Jackie McMurtrie propose safeguards to prevent
the misuse by prosecutors of high-tech and DNA evidence.
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Two articles in this Symposium address the potential for abuse in
presenting expert testimony, even after Federal Rule 702 was amended to
provide stricter regulations against unreliability. Paul Giannelli and Kevin
McMunigal raise concerns about prosecutorial presentation of unreliable
scientific testimony, and suggest evidentiary and ethical reforms. Joe
Sanders focuses on the ethical challenges faced by expert witnesses
themselves, and proposes reforms in the selection and presentation of expert
testimony to control for bias and unreliability.
Three of our authors explore the role of ethical principles in regulating
what the evidence rules call "prejudicial" evidence. Aviva Orenstein
analyzes the use of evidence of the victim's behavior in rape cases, and
concludes that evidence rules on their own are insufficient to control the
impermissible inferences that are drawn by jurors influenced by rape myths.
Todd Pettys argues that the evidentiary term "prejudice"-and the ethical
limitations on the presentation of prejudicial evidence-should be
reconsidered in light of social science research on the effect of emotions on
decision making. And Joe Colquitt considers the relationship between
stipulations and prejudicial evidence, and the related ethical considerations
arising from litigating in the "shadow" of the evidence rules.
The ethical issues arising from the presentation of false evidence have
been oft-vetted by scholars and courts, but rarely from a perspective of the
relationship between ethical rules and evidence rules. Mimi Wesson gives
an exciting account of how the presentation of false evidence can have an
impact on the very establishment of evidence rules; she shows how the false
evidence presented more than 100 years ago in the famous Hillmon
litigation left us with a questionable rule of evidence that is memorialized in
the Federal Rules of Evidence and that is, unfortunately, unlikely to change.
And Tim Perrin provides an evidence rules perspective on the conundrum
of client perjury.
The lawyer's duty of confidentiality has both an ethical and an
evidentiary component. In his contribution to the Symposium, Paul
Rothstein sets forth a proposal for a seminar that will help students master
the intricate relationship between the duty of confidentiality and the
attorney-client privilege.
Thanks are in order. First I would like to thank the authors for agreeing
to explore the complex relationship between ethics and evidence rules and
for providing such excellent submissions. I am also grateful for the
excellent work of Symposium Editor Nasim Farjad, Editor-in-Chief
Katherine Hughes, Managing Editor Patrick Connorton, and the board and
staff of the Fordham Law Review. And I am grateful to my colleague
Bruce Green, who had the idea for this Symposium and who recruited me to
help put it together.
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